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Ever since the end of World War II, there has been a trend 
towards freer world trade* One of the reasons why this trend de¬ 
veloped was due to the faot that many protective devices had failed 
to produce greater economic well-feeing* This work is chiefly concerned 
with the advantages of free trade and why this trend has gained 
i 
momentum since the close of World War II* 
The Classical School of economists, led by Adam Smith, were the 
main exponents of free trade* It is in this school of thought that 
we find the doctrines of laissez-faire and the plea for freer trade* 
Free trade, in this study, means the absence of all tariffs and all 
discrimination in International trade* It is doubtful that policy¬ 
makers would advocate free trade in this sense* However, most of them 
would favor eventual establishment of a multilateral trading system and 
lower tariffs* 
Chapter I is devoted to discussion of early progress made towards 
free trade prior to and during World War II* The free-trade ideas of 
British Economists and the trend of free trade as it developed in the 
United Kingdom and the United States are fully discussed* 
Chapter II is devoted to the basic economic reasons for the new 
trend towards free trade* Certain arguments for protectionism proved 
inadequate for increase in economic growth* Since the Trade Agreements 
Act was passed in 193U, many efforts have been made for liberal trade* 
ii 
ill 
Three international conferences contributed to the trend towards free 
trade* 
Chapter III is concerned with the Common Market and free trade* 
The various motivations for the establishment of the Common Market are 
shown to have been political, military, and economic* The Common 
Market is discussed as the most advanced stage of the trend towards 
free trade* 
Chapter IV is a summary of the basic free-trade theories, and 
conclusions are expressed in this chapter* 
The writer is indebted to Dr* William E. Gordon, Chairman of the 
Department of Economics, for his helpful criticism and untiring work 
in the preparation of this thesis* Thanks, also go to Dr. Thomas D. 
Jarrett and Mrs. A. Lamar Robinson, whose assistance made the com¬ 
pletion of this study possible* Finally, to my parents, Mr. and Mrs* 
George Jowers, I owe a debt of gratitude for their encouragement and 
financial support* 
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CHAPTER I 
EARLY MODEST PROGRESS TOWARDS FREE TRADE 
Free-Trade Ideas of British Economists 
The Classical School of economists was the main group of ex¬ 
ponents of free trade. In this school we find the development of 
Adam Smith's ideas about foreign trade. He stated a famous defense of 
laissez-faire, which, however, was not original: "Every individual is 
continually exerting himself to find out the advantageous employment 
for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, 
and not that of his society, which he has in view. But the study of 
his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to 
prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society."^ 
Man's self-interest thus became for Smith a substitute for mercan¬ 
tilist policy. In criticism of mercantilist policy Smith did not 
hesitate to charge that "their Interest is directly opposite to that 
2 
of the great body of the people." 
It is in this same context that we find his plea for freer trade: 
It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family 
never to attempt to make At home what it will cost him 
more to make than to buy. The tailor does not attempt 
 1  
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations, ed. Edwin Üannan (New York: Prentice-rfall, Inc., 193Ÿ), 
pp. 63U-UÔ. 
2 
Asher Isaacs, International Trade: Tariff and Commercial 
Policies (Chicago: Richard t). Irwin, Inc., 19hb), pp. 112-16. 
1 
2 
to make his own shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. 
The shoemaker does not attempt to make his own clothes, 
but employs a tailor. The farmer attempts to make 
neither the one nor the other but employs different 
artificers, ill of them find it for their interest to 
employ their whole industry in a way in which they have 
some advantage over their neighbours, and to purchase with 
a part of its produce or what is the same thing, with the 
price of a part of it, whatever else they have occasion 
for. 
What is prudence in the conduct of every private 
family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. 
If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper 
than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with 
some part of the produce of our own industry employed in a 
way in which we have some advantage.^- 
This concept was not new. Professor Viner tells us that "the 
doctrine that differences in natural conditions in different countries 
made trade between these countries mutually profitable" was found 
in the writings of the ancient Greeks and Romans. He points out 
further: "The early Christian philosophers took over the doctrine and 
gave it a theological flavor. God had endowed different regions with 
limited but varied products in order to give mankind an incentive to 
trade, so that through a world economy they would become united in a 
world society, and as children of one God, they would learn to love 
each other." He added that "this was apparently common doctrine among 
o 
the English theological writers of the sixteenth century and la tor." 
After Smith had expressed the thought that the benefit of foreign 




Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 193?), p. 100. 
3 
Foreign trade carries out that surplus part of the 
produce of •••«land and labour for which there is no 
demand... .and brings back in return for it something 
else for which there is a demand. It gives a value to.... 
superfluities, by exchanging them for something else, 
which may satisfy a part of (the people's) wants, and 
increase their enjoyments. By means of it the narrowness 
of the home market does not hinder the division of labour 
in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being 
carried to the highest perfection.* 
Thus, foreign trade Increases the wealth of a nation by bringing 
in treasure by enlarging the market, thereby increasing the opportunities 
for more division of labor. This is a basic way of increasing wealth. 
Smith concluded that foreign trade should lead to friendly in¬ 
ternational relations and that the gain from trade did not consist of 
the treasure. He expressed a consistent point of view about the 
balance of trade. He considered the laying of special restrictions on 
the trade with countries with which an unfavorable balance existed as 
unreasonable: 
Nothing... .can be more absurd than this whole doctrine 
of the balance of trade, upon which, not only these re¬ 
straints, but almost all the other regulations of comerce 
are founded. When two places trade with one another, this 
doctrine supposes that one of them loses and the other 
gains in proportion to its declension from the exact 
equilibrium. Both suppositions are false. A trade which 
is forced by means of bounties and monopolies may be and 
commonly is disadvantageous to the country in whose favor 
it is meant to be established.. .But that trade which, 
without force or constraint, is naturally and regularly 
carried on between any two places is always advantageous 
though not always equally so, to both.2 
The relations that existed between economists and statesmen in 
the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century, after the appearance 
Isaac, op. oit.. pp. 112-16. 
2Ibid. 
h 
of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations were explained by William Ashley in 
his Presidential address before the British Association* 
No great English economist, neither Adam Smith, Thomas Mai thus, 
David Ricardo, nor John Stuart Mill was, in fact, an "out-and-out" free 
trader so far as practical policy was concerned* Still less was any 
of them a resolute non-interventionist in economic life* For entirely 
consistent and unlimited laissez-faire conviction we should have to go 
to their more severely critical French cont errporaries* The Phy¬ 
siocrats, namely Quesnay and Turgot, advocated "laisser faire," "laisser 
passer" or complete freedom of trade without state intervention,*’ The 
English economists based themselves on certain general conclusions 
which practical politicians could easily adopt to justify absolute 
policy from which they themselves shrank* They were reverenced as 
spiritual masters, whose occasional aberrations must be lamented or 
2 
disregarded* 
Although differing from Smith on the subjects of bounties and 
the com laws, Thomas Mai thus based his arguments on expediency rather 
than on a different philosophy* He wrote that systems of restriction 
were "essentially unsocial" and that, "in reference to the Interests 
of a particular state, a restriction upon imposition of foreign com 
may sometimes be advantageous" but he thought that: 
Still more certain than in reference to the in¬ 
terests of Europe in general the most perfect freedom 
Eric Roll, A History of Economic Thought (rev. ed*j New York* 
Prentice-Hall, Inc,, 19U6), pp, 132-UO, 
^William Ashley* "A Retrospect of Free Trade." Economic Journal. 
XfflV (December, 192li), #>1-39. 
s 
of trade in corn, as wall as in every other commodity, 
would be the most advantageous,^ 
With the same approach as Smith, David Ricardo commented on 
government interference: 
The sole effect of his high duties on the importation, 
either of manufacturers or or corn, or of a bounty on their 
exportation, is to divert a portion of capital to an 
employment which it would not naturally seek. It causes a 
pernicious distribution of the general funds of the society, 
it bribes a manufacturer to commence or continue in a com¬ 
paratively less profitable employment. It is the worst 
species of taxation, for it does not give to the foreign 
country all that it takes away from the home country, the 
balance or loss being made up by the less advantageous dis¬ 
tribution of the general capital* 
A freedom of trade is alone wanted to guarantee a country 
like the United Kingdom, abounding in all the varied products 
of industry, in merchandise suited to the wants of every 
society, from the possibility of a scarcity. The nations of 
the earth are not condemned to throw the dice to determine 
which of them shall submit to famine,** 
In the case of colonial trade, as well, freedom is most conducive 
to the best employment of the labor and the resources of the world. 
But, while Smith believed that a restrictive system did harm both to 
the mother country and the colonies, Ricardo argued that the mother 
country might sometimes gain a benefit, 
John Stuart Mill witnessed much of the industrial revolution, 
the workings of laissez-faire, the social consequences of the factory 
system, the rise of socialism, the questioning of the teachings of 
the Classical School of economists, and the spread of protectionism* 
Thomas Mai thus. Principles of Political Economy (New Yorks 
Augustus Kelley, 19610, pp* 21-3U* 
2 
David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation» 
ed, E, C. K, Gonner (London: J, M, Dents & Sons, Ltd*, 1932), pp. 
108-11», 
6 
He thought that they were an "invidious exception” to the general rule 
of free tradeMill vas contemptuous of elaborate laws for the sake 
of subsistence. He held that the country was safest uhich drew its 
food supply from the largest area and that the chances of a country ever 
being engaged in war with all other countries, or blockaded as a town, 
were few. He thought however, that in times of scarcity a country 
could not be blamed for erecting barriers against export of food. 
In the realm of International trade, Alfred Marshall had little 
to add to the ideas of his predecessors. This was due to the fact 
that the United Kingdom was on a free trade basis and far removed from 
the arena of protectionist controversy. 
Later, Marshall became convinced that a protective policy in 
fact, was a very different thing from a protective policy as discussed 
2 
by sanguine economists. 
Subsequent observation strengthened his conviction. He found 
that the policy in action caused intricacy and corruption but ap¬ 
parently had not done harm to the United States because of Its sise 
and natural resources. In fact, it had probably aided a few industries 
which needed help, thereby balancing the economic loss. In making the 
essential point In the argument, Marshall stated: "It is conceivable 
that the protection which such taxes give is of greater national 
3 
benefit than the protection which they destroy.” By "protection,” 
 ï ;  
John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (rev, ed.j 
New York: D. Appleton Co., 1929), II, pp. 92-100. 
2 
Alfred Marshall, Money Credit and Commerce (London: Macmillan 
Co., 1929), pp. 107-12. 
3 
Isaac, op. cit«, p, liiE>, 
7 
as he used the word the second tine, he meant the protection to domestic 
consumers against unduly high prices due to the competition of imported 
goods* Marshall believed also that ham had been done to Germany by 
protective policy and that the United Kingdom should maintain free 
trade unless she was prepared to invite retaliation* 
While not opposed to all tariffs, Marshall favored free trade in 
principle because it had the merit of not being a nsystem” and, there¬ 
fore, was 8impie* Hé thought that in so far as the United Kingdom was 
concerned, there was no reason for changing its policy* 
The Free Trade Trend in the United 
Kingdom from lb22 to 19U5 
The duties imposed upon the United Kingdom's raw materials were 
lowered in 1822 and 1Ô2U, and were swept away entirely between 16U2 
and 18U6* The duties on partly manufactured articles were substan¬ 
tially reduced, in some cases abolished]; the duties on manufactured 
goods too were reduced or repealed* The duties on corn and meat were 
removed at the same time and only a few other foodstuffs and 
manufactures remained to be dealt with by Gladstone in l8*>3 and l860.^ 
The principle was then adopted that tariffs should henceforward be for 
revenue only* 
Shipping was deprived of much of its protection by a series of 
laws passed between 1822 and 1825, and by the reciprocity treaties 
concluded with foreign countries after 1825* Shipping was completely 
 Ï  
L* C* A* Knowles, The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions 
in Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century (rev. ed.i New York* 
E.' P.' button & S,~T^T, pF7 Ï3CÜ32:  
8 
thrown open to foreign competition by the abolition of the Navigation 
Acts in 19U9. Merchants were then free to charter the cheapest ship, 
whether English or American* With the Navigation Act vent the re¬ 
mainder of the restrictions on colonial trade under nthe old colonial 
system*" The colonists could thenceforward trade freely with foreign 
countries, employ ships of any nationality they chose, even in the 
inter-imperial trade, and admit foreigners freely to their own markets* 
The costal trade too, of the United Kingdom, was thrown open to all 
comers, in 18£U*^ 
Free trade was victorious by 18^0, but it must be remembered that 
the tariff changes were only a part of the general movement for the 
abolition of all restrictions* 
Although there was a free trade movement on the continent as 
well as in the United Kingdom the two movements differed fundamentally* 
The English free traders were the manufacturers* They feared no com¬ 
petition and they wished to be able to get raw materials under the 
cheapest possible conditions* They also wished for the free import 
of corn, partly because they thought that foreign countries could not 
pay for manufactures unless the United Kingdom opened her ports freely 
to their foodstuffs* They desired too, to stop a demand for a rise 
in wages on account of expensive food and they thought that free 
imports would lower the prices* They considered that if the continent 
could sell surplus com to the United Kingdom, the price of food would 
rise on the continent in cheap labor based on cheap food might be 
13bid* 
9 
neutralized» Therefore, the manufacturera financed the movement for 
the repeal of the Corn Laws» The Tory Agricultural party opposed it» 
They had no wish to be subjected to the effect of foreign imports, and 
urged that the ride of the ruin of English agriculture and the dangers 
of depending on a foreign food supply in time of war were great» 
As the United Kingdom had become a manufacturing state the free 
trade party was victorious» Their victory meant a complete change in 
the foreign trade polioy» As of the United Kingdom the revenue that 
was derived from the customs was diminished, some other form of 
revenue had to be found» The Income Tax was revived in 181*2 and in 
18^3, and Death Duties were imposed to cover the deficit created by 
Gladstone's tariff changes» Thus direct taxation was substituted for 
many of the old customs and excise duties»^* 
On the continent, on the other hand, the backbone of the pro¬ 
tectionist Party consisted of the manufacturers, who feared the 
English imports» There were free trade parties of agriculturists who 
wanted cheap manufactures» Thus in Germany the Agrarians or Junkers 
were free traders so were the great land owners of Russia, and the 
wine producers of France» We may add the cotton growers of the South 
of the United States» They were all exporters and wanted markets 
abroad and were willing to take manufactures in exhenage» 
When the United Kingdom put the Free-Trade doctrine into 
practice in the 181*0' s it was a turning-point in her economic develop¬ 
ment* She abandoned her national policy that was appropriate for self- 
sufficiency and made a bid for a larger part of world trade» She 
 Ï  
Ibid» 
îô 
relied on importing much of her food and paying for it with her manu¬ 
factures* The United Kingdom definitely adopted a policy of active 
participation in the world economy when other countries such as the 
United States, Germany, and Italy were struggling to attain to national 
unity and a national economy 
With the repeal of the Corn Laws in 181*6, there seemed to be no 
2 
valid argument for any sort of protection. Between l8£o and 1873, 
restraints on trade were removed and freedom was given for expansion. 
Towns became healthier places to live in. The conditions of work im¬ 
proved, employment Increased apace and these twenty-three years are 
sometimes termed the "golden age." The improvement in trade and em¬ 
ployment was no doubt largely due to the railways which facilitated 
exchange not merely in the United Kingdom but all over Europe, where 
tariffs were being lowered, after i860.' A further stimulus was the 
gold discoveries in Australia and California, which, by increasing the 
world's stock of gold, raised prices and made it worth while to embark 
on new enterprises. Engineering knowledge increased and sanitation 
was improved. Factory and mining Inspectors supervised the use of the 
new knowledge as the industrial revolution proceeded. 
There was a great expansion of trade due to the fact that the 
continent had recovered from the effects of the Napoleonic wars and 
was becoming a better customer for the manufactures of idle United 
Ibid. 
2 
C. R. Fay, The Com Laws and Social England (Cambridge: The 
University Press, 1232), pp. 182-212. 
3 
Knowles, op. cit.. pp. 136-50. 
il 
Kingdom* 
In the period 1873-1886 there was a great depression* The effects 
were world-wide* In the United Kingdom three great industries suffered 
very severely: agriculture, shipping and the iron and steel industry* 
There was a general decline in prices of all commodities, due to 
currency changes* 
Apart from the currency complication, the depression in agri¬ 
culture was due partly to the opening up of the Middle West in the 
United States* After the Civil War cultivation of the prairie lands 
began and increased rapidly* The railways were built and competed 
with one another to carry grain and other products* The low rates 
were like a bounty on exports* The competition of the steamer and the 
sailing vessel lowered freight rates and a flood of United States 
exports reached Western Europe* The continental powers dyked the flood 
with tariffs and it was diverted into the free trade markets of the 
1 
United Kingdom and produced a great depression in agriculture there. 
The result of the depression was that the period from 1886 to 
1911», was one of great change in the foreign trade policy of the 
United Kingdom* It was the period of abandonment of laissez-faire in 
colonial trade polioy, in commerce, industry and agriculture* The 
tiiited Kingdom began to modify her cosmopolitan ideas of free trade 
and laissez-faire, and to concentrate on developing trade within the 
British Empire* It was no accident that in 1887, representatives of 
the Dominions appeared as part of Uie pageant at Queen Victoria’s 
 Ï  
Ibid* 
12 
Jubilee* A colonial conference followed the Jubilee and it was re¬ 
peated in 1897 and became an institution. The United Kingdom abrogated 
her treaties with Germany and Belgian in 1897. These treaties had 
prevented her from giving tariff preferences to or accepting them from 
her colonies. The United Kingdom abandoned her pure free-trade policy 
in the interest of the West Indies and joined the Sugar Convention in 
1902. She prohibited the import of sugar from Russia, Demark, Spain 
and the Argentine. She thus enabled Germany, Prance and Austria to 
suspend their sugar bounties. As the United Kingdom was the great 
market for sugar and as she agreed to prohibit importation of sugar 
from which gave bounties on export it was not worth while for Germany, 
Prance and Austria to continue the bounty system. The United Kingdom 
had gained in the past by importing the cheap sugar.^ 
During the period from 1911^-1930, the United Kingdom remained 
largely on a free-trade basis despite the tariff reform movement in 
1903, which sought a return to a protective tariff system and the in¬ 
troduction of the imperial and colonial preference system. Such duties 
as she imposed during this time were on commodities which were also 
subject to excise taxes: spirits, wines, beer, tea, eocoa, coffee, 
chicory, sugar, dried fruits, and tobacco, and were intended for 
revenue purposes. The tariff reform ideas, however, persisted, and 
were making headway by the time World War I began. A reversal of policy 
followed. By 1930, the United Kingdom had an elaborate tariff system 
which brought in a revenue slightly larger than our own tariff revenue 
1Ibid. 
13 
for the same year* 
The McKenna duties of 1915 were imposed at the rate of thirty- 
three and one-third per cent ad valorem on such luxuries as motor cars, 
motor cycles and accessories, musical instruments, and clocks and 
watches* Motion picture films were assessed at specific rates* Although 
the avowed purpose of these tariffs was to maintain and conserve 
foreign exchange, they continued in force after the war, by annual re¬ 
newal until 192U when they were allowed to lapse, by the Labor Govern¬ 
ment, In 1919, the United Kingdom introduced the principle of British 
tariff preference which made her duties one-third of the McKenna 
duties when applied to the commodities produced in the Bnpire* From 
time to time, the degree of preference was increased, sometimes by 
increasing the general rate imposed on non-Empire goods and sometimes 
by reducing the Empire rates* 
In 1921, the Dyestuffs Importation Act went into effect pro¬ 
hibiting the importation of all synthetic dyestuffs and Intermediate 
products* This law was made permanent in 193b, and the list of re¬ 
stricted commodities was extended* 
These various duties and acts, along with others, laid the 
foundation for a new protective movement in the United Kingdom* 
In the period between 1931 and 19U5, the United Kingdom was 
essentially a country with protective duties imposed on its imports* 
To what extent Governments of the United Kingdom listened to the 
economists who opposed is difficult to say, although the fact that the 
kfidwin M. Fitch, Britain1^ New Tariff Policy (Freeport, 111,; 
Rawlelgh Foundation, 1932), p, 6* 
ÏU 
United Kingdom did not return to free trade seems to be evidence enough. 
But to what degree she kept her tariff system moderate because of their 
1 
views must remain conjectural. 
Certainly, the depth of depression, after 1931, and the con¬ 
ditions leading to the Second World War were hardly conducive to 
rational thought about tariff policy. During World War II numerous re¬ 
strictions were imposed on exports and imports. A large degree of 
autonomy was granted all British colonies, in their foreign trade. At 
the end of the war, the British Labor Party was voted into power, but 
made no substantial changes in tariff policies. 
The United States Pree Trade Policies 
from 193U to 19të 
The Tariff Act of 1930, known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, raised 
tariffs to the highest point in our history. But in 193U a retreat 
from protection began with the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act, 
Bbr the first time since before the Civil War those who believed that 
freer trade policies would strengthen rather than weaken United States 
industry saw their views reflected in tariff legislation. This act 
introduced some new principles, notably the principle of reciprocity 
whereby the United States would make concessions in its own tariffs 
Z 
for tariff concessions abroad, 
Xn June of 1933, the London Conference was held to discuss among 
other things, tariff reductions and loosening of trade restrictions, 
^Knowles, op, cit,, p, 358, 
2 
Committee for Economic Development, United States Tariff Policy 
(New ïorks Research & Policy Committee, 19U5), pp, 1-15, 
The Conference was a failure. The greatest attempt up to that time, to 
institute freer world trade proved unsuccessful. However, there were 
condemnations of quantitative restrictions in international trade, 
subject to reservations by some delegates. Tariffs were said to be too 
high; the most-favored-nation clause, in its unconditional and un¬ 
restricted form, was urged upon the conferees. Indirect or perhaps 
disguised protectionism wqa condemned.^ 
Since the London Conference, from 193k, the official tariff 
polioy of the United States has been to stimulate international trade 
by reducing tariffs and by restoring a nondlscrlmlnatory multilateral 
trading system. 
Protectionists are disposed to characterize present foreign trade 
policy as an attempt to force "free trade" on the nation, while some 
of the advocates of freer trade are critical of present policy on the 
grounds that it compromises principle. 
As used in classical political economy, the term "free trade" 
signifies the absence of all tariffs and all discrimination in in¬ 
ternational trade. It is doiiitful whether anyone with political re¬ 
sponsibility today would advocate free trade in this sense. 
The elimination of discrimination in international trade, 
however, has been a major objective of United States foreign trade 
policy ever since 1923 when adherence to the unconditional most-favored- 
nation policy was announced. Although the United States has not been 
Ï 
Department of State, Participation of the United States Govern¬ 
ment in International Conferences, July 1, 19U7 - June 30, 19UB 
(Washington* Government Printing Office, 19U9), pp. l87-8o. 
16 
willing to eliminate all of its trade barriers* it has been endeavoring 
to use its influence to reduce tariffs* as far as politically prac¬ 
ticable* as inducement to other countries to eschew the use of quotas 
and other discriminatory devices* and to join with the United States 
in re-establishing an open* multilateral trading system* This is also 
the underlying philosophy of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*1 
The policy is based on confidence that* if a multilateral trading 
system were to become a reality* not only would the volume of foreign 
trade increase* but also the persistent imbalance in international 
payments would tend to disappear as international economic equilibrium 
was attained* It implies willingness on the part of the IMited States 
and other nations to permit their economies to adjust to one another* 
It implies* also* abandonnent of some forms of national economic 
planning now widely practiced in certain countries* Many of the 
numerous and far-reaching exceptions that had to be written into the 
GATT were necessitated by the unwillingness of some of the contracting 
parties to subscribe to such an agreement* 
Even sane policy-makers who expected increased international 
trade were critical of the policy* Although most of them would have 
favored eventual establishment of a multilateral trading system* some 
of them were critical of reliance on this approach for immediate 
solution of trade problems* They thought that* after experience of 
the conditions that existed before World War I* there should have been 
no return to this unconditional most-favored-nation clause for 
 Ï  
Committee for Economic Development* op* cit,, pp* 1-15* 
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international trade* They were of the opinion that, laudable though 
such an objective was, it was a rather ineffectual way to solve the 
current trade problems* Business at the present time is conducted on 
a much larger scale than before World War 1* A relatively small number 
of companies dominate many important fields of production* Further¬ 
more, production has become so specialized and efficient that over¬ 
capacity often threatens in industries with no self-generating short- 
1 
run correctives in sight* 
Government intervention in agricultural production and marketing 
and other government responses to the demands of many powerful 
business groups, have made the problems of trade policy more com¬ 
plicated* To judge every proposed solution to an international economic 
problem on the basis of its consistency with the ideal of an auto¬ 
matically adjusting world economy is unrealistic* Instead of seeking 
to re-establish world trade as it was then, the objective of the 
United States trade policy, at least in the short and intermediate 
runs, should be to seek establishment of functioning international 
institutions for trade* This, it is said by some policy makers can 
best be accomplished through regional organizations, such as the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Bank for Inter¬ 
national Settlements, the European Economic Community, and Inter- 
national Labor Organization* 
Effective free trade requires an efficient price system, free 
 1  
Howard S. Piquet, The Trade Agreements Act and the National 




of government interference* It has been asserted that if trade were 
left alone and the "invisible hand" could do its work, the economy 
would achieve optimum outputs, and well-being would be maximized* Re¬ 
sources would be allocated to the forms of production and goods would 
be distributed to consumers, so as to ensure a maximum of satisfaction*^ 
Although this seems to be a strong argument for free trade it 
assumes that there is no marked divergence between social value and 
social cost, such as might occur if private value and cost diverged 
from social value and cost* But divergence is possible for a number of 
reasons* Among the reasons are economies and diseconomies external to 
the firm, lack of competition among firms for any reason, lack of 
competition among factors, and failure of the private enterprise system 
to maintain full employment. 
The controversy between protectionists and free traders is very 
old* Laissez-faire Liberals have argued that free trade was in the 
general interest of society while tariffs favored vested interests* 
Today, there is the argument that free trade helps monopolies while 
tariff protection favors the small firm* 
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CHAPTER II 
BASIC ECONOMIC REASONS FOR THE TREND TOWARDS FREE TRADE 
Economics of Protection!a» 
One substantial economic argument for protective tariffs means 
that in certain circumstances protective tariffs can enable a country 
to inorease the national income* This may be done by imposing pro¬ 
tective tariffs on imports which compete with domestic goods* The 
value of imports may then be less than the value of exports* There 
can thus be a saving on imports, and the importing country can in¬ 
crease internal investments* As domestic industries expand, production 
and employment will increase as positive results of tariff protection. 
This differs from the conclusion that free trade may increase well¬ 
being, Some of the other arguments for protection are about short- 
run effects and others about long-run effects* 
There are three main short-run argumentas (1) The argument to 
impose protective tariffs so that the value of imports may be equal 
to the value of exports* Thus, the balance of trade may be in 
equilibrium* Without protective tariffs, this equilibrium may not 
exist because of certain disturbances and resistance. Let us consider 
two countries, A and B, engaged in commodity trade* Equality of value 
of imports and value of exports depends on the benefit that each 
country receives. If country A receives only modest benefit and 
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and reduces its imports from country B, that country In turn may 
reduce its imports from A* Also, prices have to be considered when a 
trading ratio is established by the two countries* For stability, some 
quantities of exports at current prices should earn sufficient foreign 
currency to purchase exactly some quantities of imports of the same 
value as the exports* When these quantities are actually imported and 
exported and there can be no further gain from trade, a state of 
temporary equilibrium exists* nils example does not include non- 
commodity transactions* 
It is uncertain that protective tariffs will bring about 
equilibrium, because of possible retaliation by the exporting country* 
However, there are some circumstances in which a country would not 
retaliate* If the imports into the exporting country are indis¬ 
pensable goods, retaliation need not be feared in all possible cir¬ 
cumstances, when the protective tariff is imposed* 
A protective tariff may result in equilibrium of the terms of 
trade in other circumstances* When such a tariff is Imposed, it has 
the effect of widening the differences between prices in the exporting 
and importing countries* When the demand of the importing country is 
perfectly elastic, the exporters may be made to absorb a part of the 
protective tariff* The most favorable condition for this in the ex>> 
porting country is perfect inelasticity of the supply of exports* The 
only practicable way in which the exporters can absorb a part of the 
tariff is by quoting the importers lower prices* The importers may 
then sell to the consumers at the previous prices because the lower 
prices plus the higher tariff can be equal to the previous higher 
êi 
prices plus the lower tariff* There could be an improvement in the 
terms of trade for the Importing country, as long as there is no 
tariff retaliation by the exporting country. For apart from the tariff, 
the imports would cost less, and the addition to the tariff, which the 
consumers must pay as part of the total prices of the imports, is 
received by their own government. 
This example indicates that it could be more fruitful to think 
of constancy of prices of imports, than of equality of values of 
exports and imports as an objective of the imposition of a protective 
tariff. However, if the exporting country retaliated the outcome 
would be indeterminate. The improvement in the terms of trade in the 
importing country might cease to exist, or the exporting country 
might in turn improve the terms in its favor. But of the tariff 
conflicts ensued there would eventually be an end of tariff absorption 
by the two countries, prices of the imports of both would be higher 
and trade between the two would decline. 
The case for free trade, so that the value of imports may be 
equal to the value of exports, may be discussed as follows: Let us 
take two countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, and two 
products, wheat and doth. If each country can produce one product 
more cheaply than the other, each will have a comparative advantage in 
the production of one product and a comparative disadvantage in the 
production of the other. For example, one man could produce either 
six bushels of wheat or three yards of doth in some period, in the 
United States, and another three bushels of wheat or six yards of 
cloth, in the same period, In the United Kingdom. In this example, 
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the United States would export wheat and Import cloth,"*’ If trade were 
free, the benefits of specialization, to both countries could be a 
maximum, but that, of itself, would not equalize values of exports and 
imports. 
Competition of producers and exporters of one country with the 
producers and exporters of the same products in another country does 
not bring about equal values of imports and exports, which could con¬ 
tinue for a long time, because of intensified efforts by both countries 
to produce more efficiently. The consumers may ultimately benefit from 
this competition because lower prices may be quoted. 
Through the Export-Import Bank, loans may be granted to foreigners 
to help them to achieve higher standards of living. Domestic pro¬ 
duction will usually expand as a result. The increase in exports that 
commonly follows enables the United States to earn more of foreign 
currencies, while the foreigners' dollar earnings may not increase at 
the same rate. These results cannot tend to equalize values of imports 
and exports, even when trade is free, 
(2) The argument for protective tariffs so that monopolies may 
continue to exist: Monopolists fear the competition of cheap imports. 
An increase in a tariff may sustain a monopoly because the price of 
any import to the consumers will usually be increased by the amount of 
the tariff. When monopolies exist there is already an adverse economic 
cost to the consumer. The economy is at a distinct disadvantage when 
any exporting industry is a monopoly. This is true partly because the 
Indleberger, op, cit,, pp, 88-89, 
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monopoly industry is tempted to practice price discrimination* A 
monopolist may charge a high price to the consumer in the home country, 
when demand is inelastic, and quote a relatively low price to foreign 
importers, A government which tolerated the monopoly might not only 
impose a protective tariff, but a prohibitive one, If the monopoly had 
to face foreign competition. The height of the protective tariff would 
depend, in part, on the elasticity of foreign supply. When the supply 
is perfectly elastic, and it is mainly or exclusively for export, the 
foreign exporter cannot absorb any part of the tariff. Therefore, if 
the consumers' demand in the importing country is also very elastic 
the protective tariff would be impossible, A tariff is prohibitive 
when it is too high for an import to be sold at the exporter's price 
plus the tariff, and the importer’s profit and incidental costs, and 
whan the protective effect is sufficient to cause domestic production 
to expand to the point where no imports are demanded. This can occur 
when the domestic demand for the imported product is highly elastic. 
In the special case of cartel monopoly protection, price com¬ 
petition is eliminated, A cartel is an agreement to restrict com¬ 
petition for markets, and to maintain price. Cartels are formed also 
to take advantage of inelastic demands, consequently protective tariffs 
favor cartels. 
Sometimes a duopoly or oligopoly may be formed as a consequence 
of the imposition of a tariff to protect a monopoly. This should be 
expected when the monopolist charges such a high price for his product 
that potential competitors are tempted to take the risk of competitive 
production. 
In the ease of free trade, monopolies would be difficult, but 
possible* A monopoly price newly imposed by an importer is higher than 
the price charged in the previous conditions of free trade* The 
increase could be the same as if it were a consequence of an imposition 
of a new tariff* Since tariffs cause consumers to pay higher prices and 
monopoly imports do the same thing, monopoly importation of anything 
must be as undesirable as a protective tariff* Therefore, free or 
liberal trade would be preferable* 
(3) The argument for retaliatory protective tariffs: The case 
of a free-trade country trading with countries which have protective 
tariffs may be discussed as follows: A free-trade country may decide 
to impose protective tariffs, not for a protective purpose in the first 
place, but so as to bargain for tariff rates with the countries which 
had imposed protective tariffs* The previously free-trade country, 
would then be able to bargain for lower tariffs* The tariffs which this 
country imposed would afford protection to some industries* They would 
not have been Intended to be retaliatory in the long-run, but might 
unintentionally encourage monopolistic tendencies* 
Suppose that the country had adopted a free-trade policy in the 
first place, in order to take full advantage of the theory of com¬ 
parative cost* If it were a country that depended mainly on a single 
economic activity, such as coffee production, in Brazil, the country's 
economic welfare would have depended on the marketing of this product 
in large quantities* It would probably have been to the country's 
advantage to quote a normal price to foreigners* Sometimes it might 
have been necessary to absorb part of a tariff Imposed by a foreign 
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country in order to maintain a sufficient market. In such a case, 
tariff bargaining would be highly desirable. 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act may be considered in this 
context, because reductions in United States tariffs were granted to 
foreign countries in exchange for reductions in foreign tariffs on 
United States exports. 
When there is continuous tariff bargaining, less competition may 
exist between foreign and domestic producers* The purpose of bargaining 
is usually to increase competition, A basic effect of tariff bargaining 
may be a shift of resources from import-competing industries into export 
and other industries for more efficient uses. This depends, in part, 
on the elasticity of demand. If demand were perfectly elastic, there 
would be no shift. 
When a country retaliates to a protective tariff imposed on any 
of its exports to another, it does two significant thingst (1) It 
Increases the price of at least one of its imports to its consumers. 
By this measure it may increase its national income by saving on imports 
and increasing investments. The outcome is dubious, (2) The re¬ 
taliating country may be able to induce the country that first imposed 
a protective tariff to reduce the rate of it, and therefore in the 
course of bargaining, both countries may reduce tariffs substantially. 
When this is accomplished there is, as we have noted, a change of tariff 
policy in the direction of free trade. 
The more important arguments for protectionism are short-run 
arguments. They not only take account of the amount of the national 
income, but also show concern about its distribution* 
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However, there are two long-run arguments of significance. They 
are as follows s (1) The argument for "equalizing tariffs," both in 
their crude form and in their developed form. A crude tariff is one 
which is imposed simply for its impact effect of excluding or reducing 
imports because of fear of goods that would be sold in competition with 
similar goods produced in the importing country. Equalization of 
tariffs is a vague term. It may be discussed from two points of view: 
(a) equalization of tariffs with excise taxes and (b) equal tariffs on 
all imports of the same kind. Under (a) the excise tax may be on a 
process or on sales. In either case the tax is price-increasing. What 
is done is to increase some internal prices of imports of the same 
goods. Differences in factor costs remain the same, but the country 
may continue to import the same goods, at the same rates. The tariff 
is a revenue tariff. Such a tariff may be essential for a country 
because the government must raise funds by it for a variety of public 
purposes. Underdeveloped countries commonly collect revenue by taxing 
imports because of the reluctance of consumers to have their small 
incomes taxed directly. Under (b), when we equalize the tariffs on a 
product Imported from different countries we avoid tariff dis¬ 
crimination. This is very common. If it were institutionalized there 
could be no bilateral agreements for special tariff rates. The United 
States could not import certain raw materials from under-developed 
countries, instead of others, by giving tariff preference. 
From the point of view of free trade it is rational to ask what 
is the purpose of equalizing an excise tax with an import tax. The 
answer is simple. If trade were free, the price of any product which 
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was imported and also produced internally would depend mainly on the 
cost of production in the exporting country, and the internal cost» The 
importer would normally pay the total transport cost, and competition 
would be most effective if the import price were as profitable to the 
importer as the price quoted internally, by the domestic producer of 
the product which was sold in competition with the import, was to him* 
This could be the most desirable outcome of free-trade policy 
and we cannot expect equalization of a tariff with an excise tax to 
accomplish more, for the internal and external costs of production would 
still be the main determinants of the market price* The only purpose 
which could be served would be to collect government revenue from both 
the foreign and domestic producer without placing either at a new dis¬ 
advantage in the market. 
Imposition of an equal ad valorem percentage import tax on the 
same product, which was imported from different countries, would serve 
mainly a non-discrlminatory purpose, and as the tax could be high or 
low, but must always be greater than zero, there could be only a dif¬ 
ference of degree between such a tax and absolute free trade. However, 
this would be true only when the tariff was very low. 
The general argument for "equalizing tariffs" therefore is at 
best an argument for devices, some of which may allow substantial 
tariffs barriers to exist, and others may mitigate such restrictions on 
trade that tariffs usually oause, 
(2) The argument that protection is necessary for economic 
developmentt Economic development made possible by protective tariffs 
may give rise to some of the characteristics of a closed economy. We 
may conceive of a good example of extreme tariff protection as a country 
seeking self-sufficiency. There would be little interest in foreign 
trade. The reasons why a country would desire a closed economy would 
be to strive for national power and self-sufficiency. They are ap¬ 
propriate for mercantilism. 
There can be little doubt that in some circumstances economic de¬ 
velopment may be aided by tariff protection. Probably the most effective 
argument for protection of economic growth is simply that during the 
early period of growth, or some period of intensified growth, seme basio 
industries in a young country may not yet be competent to compete in 
productivity with older industries producing the same products in 
foreign countries, and unless the younger industries are protected and 
allowed to grow, economic development may be inadequate or may be very 
slow. In making this point, the economist has always to think of a 
time limit for protection, if for no other reason because protection can 
be given only at the expense of at least greater potential effective 
use of the same resources in other forms of production. Therefore, even 
tariff protection of infant-industries could not have been conceived with 
certainty as to permanent benefit. 
Effects of protectionism on indus try, —When private enterprise 
prevails, rates of return from investments exist, but the commonness 
rate in each industry may be stable for a considerable time, when tariff 
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rates are not changed. As protective tariffs are imposed we should 
expect some changes in investments* There may be an increase in pro¬ 
duction of goods which were sold in competition with imports, and this 
could require transfer of resources from some other forms of production* 
It is sometimes thought that, owing to the conservatism of people, 
normal incentive to shift is insufficient to make the shift occur as 
quickly as it is desirable that it should. Therefore it seems necessary 
to give more incentive artifically, in the form of tariff protection 
to an industry* This leads to the argument for protecting infant 
industries, an argument different from the recent British policy of 
safeguarding, which sought to give artificial support to industries in 
a state of natural decline* The policy has been to sustain the aged 
but indispensable industries and eliminate the weaker and less im¬ 
portant*^ 
Classical economics stressed the benefits of division of labor 
and the gains to be realized from international trade* It was shown 
that gains were possible not only for individual countries, but the 
world as a whole* Even if one country imposed restrictions, another, 
instead of following this example, would contend that "it was stupid 
to drop boulder s in a harbor merely because the people of another 
country had dropped them in their ports.Furthermore, the general 
position was that no distributive share (e*g« labor, capital) would gain 
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as a result of the introduction of protectionism 
It is necessary to consider restrictions on trade in the light of 
modéra theories of international trade and in the world of today: We 
have planned, as well as relatively free economies; developed economics 
without sufficient international reserves and others with adequate re¬ 
serves; underdeveloped economies in countries impatient to industrialize; 
a resurgence of nationalisa and increased insecurity which greatly affect 
trade policies and reduce capital movements as an equilibrating force; 
and with all these the evolution of the most severely restrictive tech¬ 
niques for limiting trade, which were virtually unknown even fifty years 
1 
ago. 
As D. H. Robertson has noted, once the gap in comparative costs 
is greatly narrowed, the gains from trade are greatly reduced and small 
relative changes in costs cause large changes in exports. Stimulus is 
2 
given then to the use of protective devices. 
Evidences of protectionism,-—In the latter part of the nineteenth 
century there were certain conditions existing in the United States 
which made tariff protection seem rational: industrial development was 
new, the population was growing rapidly, and there was a gradual but 
important change from investment in the extractive industries to greater 
efforts in manufacturing. Then industrialization was accelerated. We 
should consider, first, the transition from a purely agricultural economy 
to diversified production. Then, the great changes that took place in 
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some forms of production* The country was emerging from the colonial 
status and making productive use of economic freedom, in the early part 
of the century. A revolution of an industrial character was in 
progress. Under these circumstances it seemed that legitimate tariff 
protection of young industries was highly desirable. 
The argument for protection of young industries was Impressive 
then. During the twenty years which followed the war of 1812, the con¬ 
troversy about tariff protection was continuous. Protectionists fre¬ 
quently used the young-industry argument. 
Prevalence of Protectionism 
Of all the protectionist arguments considered, the most rational 
one was, for many years, the infant-industry argument. However, it 
could be valid only under a limited set of conditions. It is the only 
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argument for tariff protection that is valid for the world as a whole. 
The others are doubtful. Moreover, "the advantages...to be obtained by 
tariffs are either sectional if they are certain, or uncertain if they 
are general) in each case a strictly temporary gain, if any gain, is 
far more probable than a permanent one."^ When protection is made a 
policy, in an emergency, it should be temporary. 
If the case for protection is weak, why does it continue to find 
such wide support? Why cannot free traders, by the force of their 
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arguments, win to their side a majority of voters in every land, 
sufficient to cast aside protectionism? It seems that the answer is 
opposition by groups of persons who have strong political Influence, 
Some degree of protection is common, for three reasonst In the 
first place, it grows; once started, it not only persists, but also 
tends to spread. Secondly, the case for protection, though commonly 
based on fallacious reasoning, makes a strong popular appeal, which the 
case for free trade in general lacks. Closely related to this is the 
third reason, namely, the intense sectional interests that are protected 
is greater than the general interest in free trade, 
A reason why a protective tariff persists and spreads is simple, 
Exposed for specific protection, protective tariffs are maintained 
because they cannot be removed without serious injury to Influential 
productive groups. 
Protection directs production into particular channels, 
breeds vested interests, shapes men's livelihoods,,,.Sudden 
removal of a long-established high protection, such as that 
of the United States, would cause dislocation, business losses 
and unemployment on a vast scale, ,,,Once introduced, on 
however small a scale, it tends to grow and get established 
on a large scale. The Benefit of Protection to the capital 
and labour engaged in an industry seeking Protection is im¬ 
mediate, direct and obvious. If protection is granted to one 
industry, it is always difficult and often impossible to find 
reasons for refusing Protection to any other industry. If 
granted in one industry, indeed, it tends to make protection 
seem not merely equitable but necessary for others. 
This enduring and cumulative character of protection, once begun, 
of itself would suffice to explain its rapid spread. Numerous local 
groups are induced, one after another, to add their voices to expressions 
P, T, Ellsworth, International Economics (New Tories Macmillan 
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of sentiment for protection. Yet, the general interest in attaining 
the highest possible standard of living still requires freedom of trade. 
Advocates of protective tariffs commonly try to persuade, they do 
not often use rational arguments, in advancing or defending their position* 
They indulge in popular fallacies that are plausiblej they are easily 
understood by the dullest intellect. Moreover, they appeal to ignorant 
persons, to sectional prejudice, to nationalistic bias. But the free- 
trade case is unemotional. It is reasonable but unpopular. To grasp 
it thoroughly, let alone understand all its implications, requires a 
considerable degree of economic literacy, a quality possessed by com¬ 
paratively few in any society. Small wonder, then, that the oause for 
which the most should be said, is usually made second to that for which 
1 
the most is said and done. 
Efforts for Liberal Trade 
Ever since the Trade Agreements Act was passed in 193U, there has 
been a battle between the protectionist forces who would reduce its 
effectiveness, and its proponents who have been determined to reduce 
tariffs. The Trade Agreements Program, initiated in 193U as an anti- 
depression measure, has become an Important part of the foreign economic 
policy of the United States. Controversy regarding its continuance in¬ 
volves not only tariff policy, but also the nation1 s over-all foreign 
policy. Until 191+8, fourteen years after the original act was passed, 
opponents of tariff reduction were not able to convince Congress that 
it should be amended. 
"Sbid. 
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Between 1934 and 1948, nearly ninety per cent of all duitable 
imports into the United States had been covered by tariff concessions 
made under trade agreements* Over three quarters of the imports were 
subject to duties that had been reduced by sixty-six to seventy-five per 
cent* One-third of the imports of commodities on which duties had been 
reduced were articles on which the tariff had been equivalent to at 
least seventy per cent ad valorem* 
The United States obtained tariff and other trade concessions, in¬ 
cluding reduction of quotas, from other countries on a large number of 
important exports such as pork, lard, wheat, cotton, cloth, lumber, 
coal petroleum, iron and steel mill products, refrigerators and many 
other products* There is wide difference of opinion as to whether the 
concessions that the United States obtained were as important as those 
that it made* Opponents of the Trade Agreements Act criticize the 
agreements as not being "reciprocal*" A General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, known as GATT, was made in 1946* Under the authority con¬ 
ferred by the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1945, the United States 
proceeded to negotiate with twenty-two other countries for the reduction 
of trade barriers* Supporters of GATT have insisted that tariff agree¬ 
ments have been reciprocal* They cite, as evidence, concessions foreign 
countries have made to the United States* Critics have emphasized the 
desirability of increasing United States imports, as exports increased, 
beoause of the "import gap*"^ 
However, the Trade Agreements Program has been criticized by 
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certain domestic producers who have thought that they would be injured 
by tariff concessions* 
Both Congress and the administration have been on constant guard 
to ensure that no domestic industry is injured by increased imports. 
Some of the ardent supporters of the Trade Agreements Program maintain 
that the "safeguards" have been so effective as to make it almost im¬ 
possible to negotiate significant tariff reductions,^* 
The Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic 
Development, believes that tariff liberalization will strengthen the 
economy, because there will be greater productive efficiency as foreign 
and domestic producers compete more effectively. 
Tariff liberalization, which encourages imports, will induce other 
countries to buy more from the United States, Our major export industries 
are among those with the highest productivity. As their outputs and 
exports are increased, more benefit from international trade would be 
possible* Also, increase in imports at prices below those of domestic 
producers should stimulate enterprise in the United States*^ 
Three international conferences contributed to the trend towards 
liberal trade: 
The London Conference which met in London, England, in the period 
October 1$ - November 26, 1?U6, studied problems of international trade 
and employment. The conference was held under the auspices of the 
1Howard S, Piquet, The Trade Agreements Act and the National 
Interest (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1958), PD* 32-36* 
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United Nations Economie and Social Council* Delegations representing 
eighteen of the nineteen member countries participated in the deliberations* 
At the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee there was a be¬ 
ginning of a program for international economic collaboration* The 
objectives for which the TJhited States sought agreement were as follows: 
j 
(1) reduction of existing barriers to international trade so that the 
volumes of trade might be increased; (2) that international trade be 
multilateral rather than bilateral; (3) that international trade be non- 
discrlminatory; (It) that as internal prosperity and stability, both in 
industry and agriculture, were so closely related to international trade, 
stabilisation policies and trade policies must be consistent, each with 
the other; and (£) that the rules that govern international commerce be 
so made that they could be applied with equal fairness and equal force 
to the external trade with all nations, regardless of whether their 
internal economies were organized on the basis of individual or private 
enterprise, collectivism, or some combination of the two* 
In general, the Conference adopted the proposals of the United 
States and made provisions to put them into effect* It should be em¬ 
phasized that the work of the conference was done at the level of 
discussion by experts, and the negotiations were preparatory rather than 
final,1 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, otherwise 
known as the Geneva Conference, met during the period of October, 19U6 
to August, 19U7* The main purpose of the Geneva Conference was to 
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establish a free multilateral trading system with member countries and 
to expand trade of each member country with all other member countries* 
The Conference brought to a conclusion negotiations involving twenty- 
three member countries which carried on three quarters of the world's 
trade before World War II* The negotiations leading to the Agreement 
were conducted on a selective, product-by-product basis* Action on 
individual products included substantial reductions in duties on some 
products, the binding of low rates of duty on others, and the binding 
of free entry on still others* Preferences affecting a large part of 
the trade of the United States with countries in the British Common¬ 
wealth were substantially reduoed, and preferences on a long list of 
products which the United States exports to the various countries of 
the Commonwealth were eliminated* Under the terms of the Agreement no 
new preferences can be created and no existing preferences can be 
increased* 
The main provision of the draft charter completed at Geneva re¬ 
quired members of the International Trade Organization, otherwise known 
as ITO, to negotiate for the reduction of barriers to trade* The 
successful completion of the GATT removed all doubt concerning the 
workability of that provision* As to their trade with one another, 
which constitutes most of the world's trade, the members of the Pre¬ 
paratory Committee have already fulfilled their obligation* The other 
countries of the world, on joining the ITO, were to assume an 
obligation to take similar action with respect to their tariffs*^ 
T 
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The signing of the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment at Havana, Cuba, on March 2l+, 191*8, marked the 
culmination of an enterprise that had its beginnings in the declarations 
of policy that were made in the Atlantic Charter in 191*1 and in Article 
VU of the lend-lease agreements in 191*2.^ The work of the Havana 
Conference may be summarized as follows: The charter of the International 
Trade Organization had one overall purpose: to establish and maintain, 
by mutual agreement, an "open1* or multilateral system of trade relations 
between members of the organization and to expand the trade of each 
member with all other members* This purpose of the charter is stated 
In three ••key" provisions of Chapter IV, in which members agree to 
impose moderate tariffs (article l6)j to reduce tariffs on a selective 
basis (article 17); and to refrain from using quantitative restrictions, 
i,e« quotas, on imports or exports to protect particular industries from 
competition, or for other purposes restrictive of international trade 
(article 20), In article 16 each member agreed to apply, in its 
import and export trade with every other member, the same laws and re¬ 
gulations concerning customhouse procedures generally. No special 
privileges could be given in the future, and existing discriminations 
were to be based on specific agreements. In article 17, members under¬ 
took to negotiate with one another for substantial reduction of tariffs 
and elimination of preferences. Existing tariff rates were not to be 
reduced by some uniform percentage. Instead, each country could bargain 
individually with other countries; concerning tariff reductions on those 
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products which it was the chief or an important supplier* In effect, 
the countries agreed to "swap" tariff concessions on a product-by- 
product basis."*- 
In 1953, the Eisenhower administration secured from Congress a 
one-year renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, pending a report by the 
Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, which was created by Congress, 
and soon became known as the "Randall Commission." This body, con¬ 
sisting of five Senators, five members appointed by the President, 
was essentially a group for recommendation of policy rather than a study 
group. The Commission was required to ascertain what agreement could be 
reached by its members whose attitudes to foreign trade and tariffs 
varied widely. 
The Randall Commission reported to the President in January 195U* 
The recommendations of the commission, made after two months of de¬ 
liberation, were exceedingly modest. It recommended that instead of 
the President's authority to reduce tariffs to fifty per cent of their 
19U5 levels, be authorised to reduce than by five per cent a year below 
their 1955 levels, for a period of three years. It also recommended 
that the President be empowered to reduce tariffs to fifty per cent of 
their 19li5 levels and to lower tariffs in excess of fifty per cent ad 
valorem to that level, either by international negotiation or un- 
2 
ilaterally. 
In March 1951i, the President recommended certain of the 
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commission's proposals to Congress, but Congress decided to renew the 
existing law for another year, instead of accepting the proposals. Most 
of the Randall Commission's proposals were incorporated in the House of 
Representatives' bill of 19$$, which proved to be one of the most con¬ 
troversial tariff bills in recent years. The President proposed that 
Congress enact substantially what the Randall Commission had recommended, 
except that it was made clear that the authority to reduce duties in 
excess of fifty per cent ad valorem or its equivalent, to that ceiling, 
1 
was to be exercised only In trade negotiations not unilaterally. 
The bill passed by the House of Representatives was in practically 
the form in which it was proposed by the President, although several 
major amendments were added by the Senate, The Senate's version became 
the Trade Agreements Act of 1955, which was to romain in effect until 
June 30, 1958, It was a weaker tariff-reducing measure than the bill 
passed by the House and the recommendations of the Randall Comission, 
Sane defenders of a liberal trade policy have argued that the tariff- 
reducing power of the President has been limited by so many safeguards 
that it would be as correct to characterize the law as a protective 
measure as to characterize it as a measure intended to expand trade, 
A program for trade liberalization, like the reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act, that was intended to reduce tarif ft without hurting 
anybody, cannot be based on the existing evidence. The authors of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 finally recognized this aid made provisions 
for alleviating distress. The provisions included unemployment relief, 
X 
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retraining of labor, special loans, and accelerated depreciation pending 
reallocation of factors to more productive uses*1 
Thus the United States has contributed in a large degree, albeit 
with difficulty, to the International efforts for liberal trade, and 
possibly free trade. 
1 
Howard S. Piquet, The U* S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962: How 
Will it Affect Canadian-American Tirade? (Washington: Canadian-American 
Committee, 1963), pp. V-13* 
CHAPTER HI 
THE COMMON MARKET AND FREE TRADE 
Motivations 
Support for the idea of European unification gained strength 
rapidly in the aftermath of World War H. But some of the basic forces 
behind the movement were a consequence of developments which had been 
taking place for some time*1 These developments have been taken into 
account in the rest of this chapter* 
One of the reasons advanced by the Eisenhower administration in 
1958 for requesting an unprecedented five-year extension of the re¬ 
ciprocal Trade Agreements Act which was passed in 1955, was that such 
an extension was appropriate because of the integration schedule of the 
European Common Market* It would enable the Administration to negotiate 
mutual tariff concessions with the Common Market within the framework 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* In addition to keeping 
the European Economic Community's tariffs low in the interest of world 
trade, mutual concessions would help to minimize discrimination against 
United States exports in the markets of the six Common Market countries. 
Indeed, the Congressional hearings preceding the extension of the Act 
afforded opportunity for interested parties to declare their opposition 
1Altiero Spinelli, "The Growth of the European Movement Since 
World War H, " European Integration, ed* C. Grove Haines (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press, 1957 ), pp* Uo-lil, 
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to the Common Market as a means of discriminating against United States' 
exports* It is therefore necessary to study the extent to whioh United 
States foreign trade might he affected by the European economic in¬ 
tegration,^ 
For the solutions of the problems that the organizers of the 
European Common Market had to solve, Professor Viner's Customs Union 
2 
Issue could have been very helpful. The relationship between Viner's 
theory and the theoretical problems of organization of the Common 
Market is to be seen in the efforts made to reduce trade barriers. 
According to the theory a member country replaces its imports from non¬ 
union sources by imports from within the union, and shifts its exports 
from extra to intra-union destinations. The tariff policy of the 
Common Market countries was intended to accomplish these things. 
Diversion of European trade away from the United States would constitute 
an example of the shifts. 
Contrary to common apprehension, it appears unlikely that the 
Common Market will cause serious disturbances in the United States 
trade with its members,^ 
Since the end of World War II the United States Government has 
supported the principle of European economic integration, being con¬ 
vinced that the creation of a broad, competitive market in a free 
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Europe 'would build up economic strength in Europe, thereby helping to 
overcome a major impediment to the creation of a genuine multilateral 
trading system,'1' 
The European Economic Community represents the most advanced 
stage of economic integration that has been reached in the world. This 
organization and attitudes favorable to its acceptance developed out 
of the varied postwar experience of specific efforts for European 
economic unity. It is necessary to review briefly some of the principal 
postwar motivations for and formulations of regional commercial policy, 
that set the stage for the establishment of the Common Market, 
There are four motivations that can be identified as being of 
major importance for the formation of the Common Market, 
(1) First, the six original member countries of continental 
Europe had all been defeated and occupied in World War II and were 
intent on preventing a recurrence of that calamity. The remarkable 
economic revival of Western Germany gave a degree of urgency to this 
concern. Statesmen of Western Europe wanted to find a way to remove 
the potential danger of military aggression by a resurgent Germany, 
Even a formal treaty of friendship and reconciliation such as the one 
concluded between France and Western Germany in 1963 could provide no 
guarantee of peace as long as the parties were free to disregard or 
indeed to repudiate its provisions. The suggestion that seemed to give 
the greatest hope of security was to form a new institution which would 
cement the economies of the member countries into an interdependent 
"^American Management Association, The European Common Market 
(New York: Published by Association, 195^), p, ÎL2Ù, 
whole, so that independent aggressive action by a single country would 
be unlikely* A customs union seemed likely to accomplish that* 
(2) The second motive for the Common Market is related to the 
division of postwar Germany into an Eastern and a Western sector* The 
organizers of the Common Market did not think that the division of 
Germany into two sectors would be permanent* But they realized that the 
impasse caused by the cold war had made reunification by peaceful effort 
very unlikely in the near future* As reunification seemed quite im¬ 
probable, the desire of Germans for it could cause East-West tensions to 
Increase and possibly cause an outbreak of war* It seemed, therefore, 
desirable to find an outlet for western German economic expansion that 
would not increase the danger of war* Such an outlet could be provided 
by European economic integration* It could substitute European western 
economic federation for aggressive German expansion* This is not a 
suggestion that European economic integration has taken all the force out 
of the reunification issue, as far as western Germans are concerned* 
Quite the contrary* As long as seventeen million Germans live in the 
East, the issue will not die* 
(3) A third motive for establishing the Common Market was a 
desire to restore Western Europe to a place of dignity in the council 
of nations* In the face of such colossal powers as the United States 
and the Soviet Union, it was felt that individual European states had 
been eclipsed to the point of insignificance in international political 
and economic relations* It was felt that if western European nations 
were not to become insignificant in international affairs, the indi¬ 
vidual states would have to combine their economic and political power* 
Supporters of western European Integration had uppermost in their 
minds a sense of parity with, and, if need be, independence of, both 
the United States and the Soviet Union, While the "third force" idea 
has been somewhat dramatized by President de Gaulle of France, it has 
existed in other minds elsewhere, 
(U) The fourth and purely economic motive for the Common Market 
was that it would give promise of higher standards of living in the 
member countries. The idea of integration was accepted by many groups, 
because of expectation of higher rates of economic growth. The economic 
benefits that could be derived from integration had been obvious for 
many years and were not strong enough to overcome the obstacles to it. 
We shall return to the economic issues and examine them in greater detail. 
If the political motive did dominate the economic, in the 
organization of the Common Market, one may well ask why is there so 
1 
little political oontent in the Rome Treaty, The answer is to be found 
in the history of the European unity movement prior to the deliberations 
leading to the Treaty, The proponents of European unity learned that 
any impairment of national sovereignty would cause the organization to 
fail. Also, they had previously witnessed the successful formulation 
of a limited scheme of economic integration in the form of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, It was therefore decided that the way to 
encourage political unity was to make progress towards economic inte¬ 
gration. Actual economic integration would require of the member 
countries such a high degree of coordination of their national policies 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Coranunity and Connected 
Documents, Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euratom (Bresaels. 
n.d.), Article U+8, p. 119, 
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that political unification would necessarily develop as a consequence* 
While the Rome Treaty is limited to the creation of an economic in¬ 
stitution, the authors thought that something more was involved—the 
birth of the spirit of national sacrifice for community welfare, and 
this spirit would carry the movement on to political unity,'*' 
There were, of course, sound economic reasons for setting up an 
integrated western European economy. It meant advantages of scale, 
greater opportunities for specialization, lessened vulnerability to 
cyclical depressions, cheaper goods, higher real incomes, and stable 
prices. Yet the fact that the Common Market is primarily an economic 
undertaking for continuous improvement in living standards and working 
conditions, as set out in the Treaty's preamble, as its essential aim, 
is due, as we have seen, largely to historical reasons. The men who 
contemplated it might have been idealists, but they were also political 
realists. After the success of the European Coal and Steel Community 
and the failure of the European Defense Community they thought that the 
foundations of political unity had to be laid in the economic sphere, 
where integration would require no surrender of sovereignty but only a 
gradual and inconspicious lowering of trade barriers whilst the six 
economies became interdependent. Thus the traditional divisions would 
lose importance, with the growth of a sense of common material and 
economic interest, and the making of some major rational economic 
policies would be done by the Common Market organization. 
The Treaty signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, can be considered as 
^Lawrence B, Krause. The Common Market (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc,, 1961; ), pp, 3-5, 
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a blueprint for economic integration. It defined objectives, indicated 
methods, and established institutions. Signing of the Rome Treaty 
changed nothing. It merely started processes from which the new regional 
economic structure has been emerging. 
The Treaty itself is not a product of any political or economic 
doctrine. The central theory for it is that the merging of the six 
economies will make for rapid and stable economic progress, and that in 
the enlarged market for all member countries, free and fair competition 
will exist. Since the six countries all have in varying degree private 
enterprise economies, the merging of them should sustain private en¬ 
terprise. However, nothing in the Treaty is opposed to government 
economic planning. 
The creation of the Common Market required a carefully balanced 
set of plans. Ideally, provision would have been made to afford such 
economio progress in each member country as its political leaders and 
administration could consider adequate or satisfactory. Provision was 
made for a twelve-year transition period. It was divided into four- 
year stages, at the end of each of which due all-round progress was to 
have been achieved before the measures for the next stage could be 
planned. Progress in one member country was not to be allowed to exceed 
achievement in others, least one member gained greater advantages or 
made bigger sacrifices than another.'*' 
Expectations 
^"Michael Shanks and John Lambert, The Common Market Today and 
Tomorrow (New York» Praeger, Inc., 1963), pp. U3-U5* 
Ü9 
The Treaty required certain common economic policies and a variety 
of procedures for ensuring close consultation and collaboration by the 
members. Each member was to follow "the economic policy necessary to 
ensure the equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to 
maintain confidence in its currency, while ensuring a high level of em¬ 
ployment and stability of the level of priees*These expectations 
were consistent with the broad alms of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization of 
the Common Market would continue to have important economic relations 
with the rest of the world, and that the regional arrangements would 
function smoothly only if equilibrium was maintained by each member, 
with the world as a whole rather than with the Community alone. 
In order to facilitate the realization of these common expectations, 
members are required to coordinate their anti-cyclical and general 
financial policies. The coordination is to be accomplished by col¬ 
laboration of the competent ministries of member governments and their 
central banks. In addition, a Monetary Committee was established to 
keep under review the "monetary and financial situation" and "payments 
system" of member states, and to formulate judgments of the policies 
they should follow. Much of this machinery of consultation is not new. 
Within the OEEC framework, frequent consultation took place at meetings 
of the Managing Board of the European Payments Union, and among central 
2 
banks under the aegis of the Bank for International Settlements. 
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There is a presumption, however, that such consultations will be more 
intimate among the Six and that policy coordination will gradually 
become more effective than in the past. 
If, despite this close coordination, a member has difficulty with 
its balance of payments, and the difficulty is likely to affect the 
functioning of the Common Market adversely, the Conmiission would study 
the problem and make recommendations to the member concerned as to 
measures which that member should adopt. Although not specified in the 
Treaty, it is implicit in it that internal measures would be con¬ 
templated, They may be a tightening of credit, a reduction of government 
expenditures, an increase in taxes, or possibly an adjustment in the 
exchange rates of its currency. 
If the actions taken by the member should prove insufficient to 
overcome the difficulty, the Council could, by majority vote, on the 
recommendation of the Commission, grant "mutual assistance, " This need 
not take the form of financial assistance. It may be given in various 
ways in which the Community fulfills its obligation to come to the 
assistance of a member in difficulty. 
During the transition period, mutual assistance could take the 
form of special reductions in tariffs or accelerated increases in 
quotas for the purpose of facilitating an increase of imports from the 
state in difficulty. Other forms of mutual assistance could be granted 
either during or after the transition period. They include the granting 
of credits by other members, concerted action by other international 
organisations, presumably especially short-term lending organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the European Fund, and any 
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measure necessary to avoid diversion of trade, when the country in 
difficulty maintains or re-establishes quantitative restrictions against 
third countries. In the latter case, unless trans-shipment controls 
were imposed by other members, quotas directed against third-countries 
could be nullified by Importation of third-country goods via other 
member countries* 
If these various forms of mutual assistance were insufficient, 
the Commission would be required to authorize particular measures of 
safeguard to be taken by the country concerned. Although the Treaty 
does not state the measures in detail, the Commission would presumably 
authorize imposition of quantitative restrictions on imports from third 
countries* 
The foregoing safeguards may be taken only when they are author¬ 
ized by the Commission* But if a crisis occurs which makes the balancing 
of the balance of payments seem impossible, a member may provisionally 
take the necessary safeguarding action without specific authorization* 
Strict limitations would be imposed* The measures must be such as would 
cause the least possible disturbances in the functioning of the Consnon 
Market, and they are subject to suspension or abolition by the Council*^ 
Short-run Goals 
We have seen what are the ultimate objectives of the Common 
Market: virtually to merge the economies of the member states into one, 
by breaking down the barriers between them and working out common 
policies* We have outlined the elaborate and carefully balanced system 
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of institutions set up for this purpose. Now we can consider the 
economic questions. 
The three stages already mentioned may be more clearly dis¬ 
tinguished: The first stage is the customs union or short-run goal of 
free movement of all goods throughout the area; the second is establish¬ 
ment of the Common Market strictly so-called, without any discrimination 
because of nationality; and the third stage, that of genuine economic 
union, which requires the application of common policies in those 
sectors of the economies in which the role of the state makes them 
1 
necessary. 
The basic purpose of the customs union is the elimination of 
import and export duties and other charges, in the trade of member states 
with one another. They must be eliminated by the end of the transition 
period, which ends in 1970, 
During this period customs duties imposed by member nations on 
imports from union countries are being gradually eliminated in the 
following manner: the basis is tariffs applied on January 1, 1957 all 
duties were to be reduced by ten per cent one year after the Treaty 
became effective. Thereafter, they were to be reduced at intervals of 
from twelve to eighteen months. Each decrease was to be a ten per cent 
reduction of the total tariff. At tbe same time, the rate on each 
individual product was to be reduced by a minimum of five per cent. The 
total tariff on each product imported by each member nation was calculated 
by multiplying the basic duty applied on January 1, 1957, by the value 
of the total imports from other member nations (hiring 1956, 
^Shanks and Lambert, op, cit,, p, 56, 
$3, 
The program is somewhat flexible. Member states may reduce tariff 
rates on certain products more slowly than on others, if at the same 
time duties on other products are lowered more quickly than the duties 
on these, provided that the obligations to reduce the total tariff by 
ten per cent and the specific tariffs by five per cent are fulfilled. 
Tb avoid needless delay in reduction of tariffs on certain 
products, members must report to the Comission when putting this pro¬ 
vision into practice. They were to do their utmost to effect a minimum 
reduction of twenty-five per cent by the end of the first stage and a 
minimum reduction of fifty per cent by the end of the second stage. 
Export duties and charges having the same effect were to be 
eliminated by the end of the first stage. 
In establishing the common external tariff, member nations must 
be guided by the rulings of the GATT* The Treaty provides that the 
common external tariff rate should not exceed the average of the duties 
actually applied on January 1, 1957, in the four customs areas which 
make up the Community. While use of the arithmetical average is the 
general rule as far as the common external tariff is concerned, the 
Treaty provides for certain exceptions, listed in the Annex to the 
Treaty, whereby rates on certain products may not exceed certain per¬ 
centages. Rates for individual members were to be adjusted up or down 
towards the common tariff. This was to be done gradually, at the end 
of each of the three stages of the transition period, by thirty and forty 
per cent respectively. The Treaty includes a hardship clause under which 
the Commission may allow a member state faced with nspecial difficulties* 
to postpone compliance with the reduction program. A postponement, 
however, may not be for an indefinite period, and the items specified 
may not represent more than five per cent of the member state's total 
annual imports from third countries. 
In addition, the administration of the Community has the power to 
grant tariff quotas to member nations, under certain conditions, which 
would enable them to import goods within the limit of the quotas at 
reduced rates or without tariff. 
The rates of the common tariff can be modified or entirely 
eliminated by negotiation with third countries granting equal con» 
cessions, or by the Community itself for economic reasons. 
Special provisions govern German trade relations with the other 
member countries and those independent overseas countries having separate 
tariff agreements with certain member nations. 
The establishment of the Common Market, as a customs union, was 
intended to terminate all tariff agreements between member states and 
impose common tariffs on imports from the outside world. These tariffs 
can be modified.^ 
Long-run Goals 
The basic goal of the Coimon Market is the abolition of trade 
barriers, such as tariffs and quotas. The abolition is to be completed 
more or less automatically in a period of from twelve to fifteen years. 
Achievements were assigned for each stage, under the supervision of the 
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institutions of the Community, These targets not only require specific 
progress in the removal of trade barriers but also measures for 
similarity of economic policies. 
To ensure a simultaneous development in the member countries of 
the Common Market and growth of common economic and social institutions 
by appreciation of policies which were made for it, the operation of 
more or less automatic machinery for the reduction of custom barriers 
has been linked to the progress being made under other provisions of 
the Treaty, This link is provided by the procedure for transition from 
the first to the second stage of the progress of the Market, It is at 
the second stage that further steps towards a free market will be taken 
only if there is confirmation of substantial progress in reduction of 
intra-union tariffs, and in other specific directions, in particular 
the development of trade in agricultural products by means of long¬ 
term agreements, equalization of wages of men and women, and establish¬ 
ment of a common external tariff. 
But the Treaty of Rome did not provide for establishment of a 
political community. The machinery for co-ordination was restricted 
to the minimum requirements which could be foreseen or, "so far as was 
necessary to the proper working of the Common Market,n If more than 
this were attested there could be encroachment on the political inde¬ 
pendence of the member states. One of the virtues of the Treaty is 
that it avoided involvement with the doctrinal differences in con¬ 
victions of supporters of a liberal, and a managed economy. It limited 
members to procedures which the Treaty prescribed, with a due con¬ 
sciousness of the problems of sovereignty in the minds of its makers. 
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What was important was certainty that the decisions necessary could be 
made* 
It is important to realize that this caution, was inevitable 
because of the instability of economic conditions, and political senti¬ 
ment* The Treaty had to be practicable on all member countries. This 
was very much in the minds of the negotiators* Its provisions were 
therefore limited, in the main, to economic co-operation and mutuality* 
It may be easy to begin to reduce trade barriers, but it is 
difficult to continue beyond the first steps* It is even more difficult 
to complete the process, and establish free trade* It is in this light 
that we must regard the main provisions of the Treaty* It was made for 
economic growth by mutuality* There is to be continuous development 
with flexibility for periodical adjustments, and creation of independent 
institutions, vested with powers of their own and able to guide and lead 
1 
at all times* 
Tariff Policy for Trade With the Rest of the World 
The governments and the peoples of the six countries do not 
conceive of this movement towards unity as being outside the framework 
of the Atlantic Alliance* They do not conceive of a united Europe as 
a third force* It is not intended that the Common Market should affect 
the economies of other countries adversely* The approach to trade with 
third countries, including the United States, is liberal* 
For example, Article 18 of the Treaty reads as follows: 
^Shanks and Lanfcert, op* cit*, pp, U3-Uij James Allen, The European 
Common Market and the C*A«T*T* (Washington* University Press of 
Washington, I960), p* lj* 
Member States hereby declare their willingness to con¬ 
tribute to the development of international commerce and the 
reduction of barriers to trade by entering into reciprocal 
and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the re¬ 
duction of customs duties below the general level which they 
could claim as a result of the establishment of a customs 
union between themselves.1 
As to quotas, which have been an obstacle to development of trade 
between the United States and Europe since the end of World War II, the 
member countries have declared that their objective is to liberalize 
trade with third countries at the highest possible uniform level. The 
six Common Market countries are to adopt the most liberal import policy 
that their balance-of-payments positions will permit. They are not to 
use quotas and quantitative restrictions as protectionist devices to 
shield their industries from competition. 
The Association of Overseas Countries and Territories, and the 
relationship between Europe and Africa established in the Treaty, are 
essential parts of the agreement. They must be viewed not only from an 
economic but also from a political standpoint. 
The Treaty provided for joint economic action in Africa and in 
the other overseas countries linked to any of the Six. First of all, 
these countries were to enjoy free access, for their goods, to the 
European Common Market. Secondly, they were to be able to buy the 
goods they needed wherever, in the six countries, they were cheapest and 
of the quality required* The French have given up all rights to pre¬ 
ferential treatment. Thirdly, the Six were to contribute to a de¬ 
velopment fund, apart from what was already being spent, to help improve 
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the economies of underdeveloped countries in Africa, Lastly, the Six 
have agreed that, in order to ensure development in African countries, 
those countries must protect their infant industries against competition 
from industries in the Common Market countries* 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Review of Classical Theories of Free Trade 
The beginning of the nineteenth century marked the rise of the 
Classical School of economists. It was this group who chiefly sup¬ 
ported the idea of free international trade. 
Adam Smith conceived some ideas about foreign trade and expressed 
his doctrine of laissea-faire, Smith thought that the individual 
seeking his own self-interest without government restraints, would 
contribute most to social well-being. The "invisible hand" would ensure 
this. He was critical of mercantilism because the mercantilists ad¬ 
vocated restriction of trade. 
Smith advocated free trade because he thought that no country 
should attempt to produce anything which could be imported at a lower 
cost. Since all countries were not equally endowed with natural re¬ 
sources, some goods could be produced in some countries more cheeply 
than others. He thought, also, that foreign trade increased the wealth 
of a nation because producers and exporters gained access to larger 
markets. This seemed necessary for the greatest possible benefits from 
division of labor. He thought that there would be friendly relations 
between the peoples of trading countries, although the gains from trade 
might not always be equal. 
Adam Smith’s ideas about free trade are still valid, but his 
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broader (conceptof laissez-faire was too optimistic. An individual 
seeking his own self-interest usually has only a secondary interest in 
the well-being of the society. Any benefit that society receives as a 
result of an individual's efforts in seeking his self-interest, is 
coincidental. We cannot expect, rationally, that the "invisible hand" 
would function for social well-being, without some degree of regulation. 
Also, the mercantilists did appear to have the interest of the public 
in mind, for they sought national power and self-sufficiency. However, 
in opposing free international trade, they were indifferent to the social 
benefits which could be obtained by it. 
Smith's free-trade theory was based on the concept of comparative 
cost advantage. He thought that a country should export the goods in 
the production of which it had "the greater advantage", and import 
those in the production of which its advantage was less. There is a 
limit to the mutual benefit that is possible. The gains of both 
countries, from the trade, must continue and be as nearly equal as 
possible. 
Finally, division of labor as advocated by Adam Smith, pre¬ 
supposes the existence of wider markets and international trade. If 
international trade does not exist, the full advantages of division 
of labor and specialization may not be realized. 
Unsocial trade policies.—Thomas Maithus supported the doctrine 
of laissez-faire and encouraged free trade. He based his argument on 
expedient means. He did not produce a different theory. Malthus 
thought that the imposition of trade restrictions was "essentially un¬ 
social, " although he believed that it was sometimes advantageous for 
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England to impose restriction on imports of foreign corn. In the main 
he thought that complete freedom of trade would be advantageous to the 
entire continent of Europe. 
There can be little criticism of Maithus's idea of employing 
efficient means to accomplish the desired ends of free trade. However, 
to say that systems of restriction are Essentially unsocial" may be 
unfair. A country should not be criticized adversely for imposing re¬ 
strictions on its imports if it could no longer obtain benefit from the 
trade. A government which Mai thus would accuse of "unsocial" trade 
policy could be practicing a rational economic policy. A consequence of 
making an exception of corn was protection of the price of the English 
growers. 
Imposition of trade restrictions.—David Ricardo wrote that re¬ 
strictions on imports would tend to force the importing country to divert 
some of its productive resources to industries in which it normally 
would not be engaged, but free trade would protect a country like the 
United Kingdom from scarcity, even though that country had a considerable 
variety of products. Freedom of trade could make colonial trade 
beneficial to the colonial owners of plantations and to processors of 
the raw materials imported from the colonies, but not certainly to con¬ 
sumers in the mother country. While Stadth believed that a protective 
system did harm both to the mother country and the colonies, Ricardo 
thought that the mother country might sometimes gain a benefit. 
Trade restrictions would not always force a country into economic 
activities in which it would not otherwise engags. In all probability, 
the country which Imposed the restrictions on trade in the first place, 
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did so with the intention of fostering domestic industries in which it 
was already engaged. Scarcity, in the short run, can hardly be avoided 
always, regardless of international trade policy. However, under 
conditions of free trade, scarcity may be less because resources may 
be employed more productively, and imports would be cheaper* 
Barriers erected against the export of food.—John Stuart Mill, 
too, supported the doctrine of free trade. He wrote that the country 
was safest which drew its food supply from the largest area and that 
the chances of a country ever being engaged in war with all other 
countries, were few. He thought, however, that in times of scarcity, 
a country could not be criticized for erecting barriers against export 
of food* 
Mill's ideas about international trade, including trade in food 
products, seem to be very consistent with the doctrine of free trade* 
The wider the market area, the greater the chances of importing food¬ 
stuffs at prices relatively low. But during times of scarcity in the 
home country, no one should expect the country to export scarce goods 
freely, even though conditions of free trade were preferable to the world 
as a whole* Unrestricted exports would cause high prices to rise 
higher. 
Protective trade policies create intricacy and corruption*— 
Alfred Marshall had little to add to the ideas of his predecessors as 
far as free trade was concerned* This was probably due to the fact 
that tine United Kingdom was on a free-trade basis in his time, and there 
was little of the protectionist-free trade controversy* Marshall said 
that protective trade policies caused intricacy and corruption* He 
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thought that some protection produced greater national benefit than the 
protection >ihich it destroyed. However, Marshall basically favored free 
trade over protectionism. 
Marshall made a very interesting statement when he suggested that 
protective trade policies caused intricacy and corruption. An example 
of this could be a case of infant-industry protection. Often an infant 
industry is reluctant to dispense with protection even after the infant 
has grown up. Protection may continue to exist at the expense of other 
industries and the consumers, who must continue to pay higher prices 
than they would have to pay if the protection was discontinued. For 
instance, consider imports of glass from Japan and exports of petroleum 
to Japan by the United States. If trade barriers were erected in the 
United States against Japan's glass products, the petroleum industry in 
the United States could expect a decline in its exports to Japan 
because the Japanese would earn less dollars and would be unable to 
import the same quantity of petroleum products. In the United States, 
savings would be made on imports and there would be "national benefit." 
However, there would be at least a temporary loss in the petroleum 
industry. Marshall believed that in such circumstances, the gains 
enjoyed by the import-competing industry in the United States would be 
greater than the unnoticed protection from foreign tariffs, afforded an 
export industry under conditions of free trade. 
Common Reasons for Resistance to Free Trade 
Certain arguments for protective tariffs, suranarized below, have 
long been the main resistance to free trade. Whether or not these 
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arguments have validity depends on certain conditions which are not 
stable. Evaluation of these arguments will bring out the nature of the 
developments which must ensue if the arguments are to be regarded as 
valid. 
It is stated in Chapter II, p. 1, that one substantial economic 
argument for protective tariffs is that in certain circumstances these 
tariffs can enable a country to increase the national income. This can 
be done by imposing protective tariffs on imports which compete with 
home-produced goods. The national income and economic well-being can be 
increased in this manner if the benefits derived from protective tariffs 
by import-competing industries and the country as a whole exceed the 
losses of the exporting industries, in a case of foreign retaliation. 
It is important to remember that a country pays for its imports from 
income received from its exports and a consequence of a tariff which 
reduces imports may be a decline in exports. While production and em¬ 
ployment may be increasing in the import-competing industries, both may 
be decreasing in the exporting industries. The over-all benefits and 
gains must be looked at before determining whether a country has in¬ 
creased its national income and economic growth. 
There are three main short-run arguments for protective tariffs» 
(1) The argument to impose protective tariffs so that the value of 
inports may be equal to the value of exports* The protective tariffs 
are Imposed in the first place in order to reduce imports. As a re¬ 
duction in exports should be expected by the country imposing the pro¬ 
tective tariffs, the outcome should be considered as uncertain. Only 
in circumstances in which foreign demand is inelastic and the exported 
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products are indispensable goods, could there be no probability of re¬ 
taliation, Also, the total volume of trade between the two countries 
may be reduced in the process, 
(2) The argument for protective tariffs so that monopolies may 
continue to exist: A country which tolerated a monopoly in the first 
place would be at a distinct disadvantage. This is because a monopolist 
has opportunity to fix his own prices and the prices can be expected 
to be higher than they would be under conditions of free competitive 
enterprise. The monopolist can charge a higher price to domestic 
consumers when demand is inelastic, and quote a lower price to foreign 
consumers who se demand is relatively elastic. The consumers are the 
ultimate losers, 
(3) The argument for retaliatory protective tariffs: This 
argument suggests that sometimes it may be beneficial for a country to 
impose protective tariffs as a bargaining device. In other words, 
protective tariffs may be imposed with the intention to reduce them if 
the foreign countries wouLd agree to reduce high tariffs which they had 
previously imposed. However, there is a limit to tariff bargaining. 
When there is continuous bargaining less competition between foreign 
and domestic producers may exist, yet one of the primary objectives of 
bargaining is to increase competition. Tariff bargaining should result 
in change in the direction of free trade policy. 
There are two long-run arguments for protective tariffs: (1) 
The argument for "equilizing tariffs:” When we speak of equal tariffs 
we may mean equating tariffs with excise taxes. This has the effect of 
increasing the prices of domestic goods, because the importing country 
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increased the prices of imports of the same goods. There are several 
reasons why the excise taxes may be imposed rationally. One is that 
imports are taxed to avoid taxing consumers1 incomes directly. Another 
reason is to avoid tariff discrimination, although the tariffs themselves 
may be equalized. It appears, however, that conditions of free trade 
are preferable to equalization of tariffs. In the case of free trade, 
the price of an import would commonly be based on the costs of pro¬ 
duction and transport. 
(2) The Argument that protection is necessary for economic de¬ 
velopment* There can be little doubt that in some circumstances economic 
development may be aided by tariff protection. 
Stated very simply, the argument runs as follows* A nation in 
the early stages of economic growth may have all the potential require¬ 
ments for the d evelopment of certain types of manufacturing. That is, 
it could be expected to achieve comparative advantages in these forms 
of production, given sufficient time* Since the country is in a low 
stage of economic development, however, the necessary skilled labor may 
not be available* If firms should be established and should attempt 
to produce, they could be undersold by foreign competitors who had the 
advantage of experience and of location in a more developed industrial 
society* Therefore, in order to get started, industries should be pro¬ 
tected from foreign competition, for some time, by means of tariffs. 
During this period of protection the necessary investments can be made 
and the skills needed can be acquired. Once the stage of adolescence 
has passed and maturity has been reached, however, tariff protection 
should be removed and the industry left to stand on its own feet. 
67 
Limits to Free Trade 
Implicit In the Idea of the advantages of division of labor In 
production Is the desirability of having International markets and free 
trade* 
Although the advantages of free trade are generally acknowledged, 
policies of governments and their institutions often conflict with the 
free-trade doctrine* There are two main reasons why goverments impose 
limits on free trade: (l) Since national specialization involves 
building up of those industries in which a country has a comparative 
advantage, the expansion of the country’s export industries may be 
achieved at the expense of other industries* The export industries may 
divert labor and capital from less effective industries* (2) The less 
effective industries face direct competition when free trade is in¬ 
stituted* Goods of foreign origin can then compete effectively with the 
products of these domestic industries* Appeals are made to governments 
to postpone the threatened elimination of the least efficient national 
producers* Political and social pressures are exerted* These commonly 
take the form of assertions that domestic industries have to pay higher 
wage rates than do foreign firms engaged in the same forms of pro¬ 
duction. Workers as well as employers seek relief from governments* 
As is so often the case, these individuals are much more aware of their 
interests as producers and workers than as consumers* The free-trade 
arguments subordinates some domestic producers' interests to those of 
the consumers; it frankly states that if the most effective national in¬ 
dustries are to enjoy substantial export markets, the less effective 
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industries must improve their productivity, so that their products might 
compete with imports. This amounts to saying that in favoring the 
consumer interest, the free-trade principle favors one group of national 
producers, the exporters over another group, the producers who compete 
with the importers. 
Free trade should not be entirely free in an underdeveloped country. 
Such a country could not hope to reach maturity in industrialization as 
long as imports from highly developed economies flowed in. Time must 
be given for skills to be developed. For this reason governments 
protect domestic producers in varying degrees, against foreign com¬ 
petition, by restricting inports by means of protective tariffs. 
Summary of Economic Progress 
The tariff histories of the United States and the United Kingdom 
describe two similar cycles. Both histories reflect the influence of 
economic theory, industrial development, and international politics. 
The free-trade trend in the United Kingdom began in 1822, and by 
I8I4.6, the duties on raw materials had disappeared entirely. Subse¬ 
quently, duties on partly manufactured goods and fully manufactured 
goods were reduced also. The United Kingdom led the way with a uni¬ 
lateral reduction. By 18^0, free trade had been accomplished. Re¬ 
straints on trade were removed and freedom was given for expansion of 
foreign trade. Because of the hardships caused by the depression of the 
1870*s, the United Kingdom made a great change in its foreign trade 
policies. She began to modify her ideas of free trade and laissez-faire. 
Tariffs were increased again after i860. Trade restrictions became more 
severe in the 1920's, and the global depression of the 1930's caused 
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many countries to restrict imports# Despite these ohanges in policy, the 
United Kingdom remained largely on a free trade basis until 1930* In 
the period 1931 to 19U5, the United Kingdom was basically a country with 
protective policies, but the tariffs were moderate# The quantitative 
trade controls of the 1930's remained in force during World War II, but 
were gradually reduced in the 1950's# Then, European governments began 
to lower their tariff barriers, but primarily those against European 
trade, not imports from the outside. world# The Common Marie et is the 
final outcome of this trend# 
The free-trade trend began in the United States in 193U with the 
passage of the Trade Agreements Act# This Act introduced the principle 
of reciprocity, which meant that the United States would offer tariff 
concessions to other countries in return for concessions from them# The 
United States negotiated tariff treaties with a number of countries, 
and in the 19U0's and after World War H, participated in new tariff 
bargaining such as the bargaining that produced the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade# 
Since that time, official policy of the United States has been to 
stimulate international trade by reducing tariffs and by restoring a 
non-discriminatory multilateral trading system. Supporters of this 
policy hoped that it would increase the volume of foreign trade, and at 
the same time the persistent imbalance in international payments would 
tend to disappear# 
The coming decade may witness a further reduction of tariffs 




The Classical School of economists, mainly Adam Smith, were the 
chief exponents of the free-trade theory in the last century* The theory 
is favorable to growth of division of labor, specialization, optimum 
combination of factors, economic benefits of competition, and maximum 
range of choice for the consumer* Snith’s book, The Wealth of Nations, 
did more to introduce free trade into Western Europe than any other work. 
Adam Smith was primarily a philosophic observer of man's struggles to 
earn a livelihood from his environment. He was interested in commercial 
activities because they were a means to an end* Division of labor and 
its advantages are a dominant thane in this work* One of his main 
contributions was his attack on the numerous government restrictions on 
trade* In later years Smith was to become a rallying point for those 
business leaders in the United Kingdom and Western Europe who desired 
an extension of free trade* 
With the exception of different emphases in a few cases, Thomas 
Malthus, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and Alfred Marshall all shared 
the conviction of Adam Smith, that trade should be free* 
The doctrines of the classical economists were so impressive in 
the literature on economic thought, that despite a diminished useful¬ 
ness, academic interest in them grows with the passage of time* 
Some of the basic economic reasons for the trend towards free 
trade came about as a result of the failure of many protective tariff 
arguments to withstand close examination* Many of these arguments were 
based entirely on fallacious reasoning* Of all the protectionist 
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arguments considered, the infant-industry argument is the only one which 
can be defended economically* 
However, despite the fact that a theoretically acceptable argument 
can be made for infant-industry protection, there are several doubts 
concerning its validity* (l) The first is about determining in advance 
whether or not a particular industry will be able to develop a com¬ 
parative advantage or to become self-sustaining* Such a judgment is 
often difficult* (2) There is the further problem of what is to be 
done if infant-industry protection is granted but the industry fails to 
develop, as was expected* Is the tariff then to be removed and the 
industry allowed to perish? Or is protection to be made permanent and 
the industry to be forever supported by the public? Removing tariff 
protection in such cases would be politically difficult to accomplish* 
The tariff would probably remain. 
Fundamentally, advocates of infant-industry protection have no 
quarrel with the case for free trade or the theory of comparative ad¬ 
vantage* They believe in the advantages of international specialization 
and division of labor but their desire to use protective tariffs is 
often inspired by self-interest. Some advocates, however, hope that 
the protective "infants" will gain competitive strength, 
Sven in cases in which infant-industry protection is successful 
and efficient firms develop, the chances of removing the tariffs are 
commonly few* By the time some industries reach adult status, they 
have acquired political power, sufficient to induce legislatures not 
to remove the tariffs. They want to continue enjoying the profits which 
their protected position brought. 
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It appears that the number of cases in rtiich infant-industry pro¬ 
tection can be given successfully in any country is small. Since there 
is no reliable way to determine in advance whether or not a particular 
industry should be located in a given area, at a given time, protective 
tariffs may result in the use of resources at needless high cost. 
Failure to remove such tariffs may make continued non-economic use of 
resources possible. 
Since 193k, there has been a battle between the protectionist 
forces who would reduce the effectiveness of the Trade Agreements Act, 
and its proponents who have been determined to reduce tariffs. The 
Trade Agreements Act was initiated in the first place as an anti¬ 
depression measure, and has since become an established basis for 
foreign economic policy of the United States, Controversy over the Act 
involves not only tariff policy but also other foreign policy. It was 
not until 191*8 that opponents of the Trade Agreements Act were able 
to pass an amendment to it. 
Three international conferences, the London, Geneva, and Havana, 
also contributed to the trend towards liberal trade. Among the main 
objectives sought were reduction of existing trade barriers, multi¬ 
lateral trade, and non-discriminatory trade. The reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act was intended to reduce tariffs without injury to any 
country. This was not possible. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
recognized this and made provisions to alleviate injuries, such as loss 
of markets to producers whose products were sold in competition with 
imports, and unemployment. 
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Since the end of World War II, the movement for European inte¬ 
gration has rapidly gained strength* This trend developed because of 
various military, political, and economic reasons: (l) Statesmen 
wanted to remove the possibility of aggression by Western Germany, (2) 
desire to restore Western Europe to appropriate status, with prestige 
comparable to that of the United States or the Soviet Union, and (3) 
expectation of higher rates of economic growth and higher standards of 
living* These were the main motivations for European unity and there¬ 
fore the Common Market* It is intended that the economic union of the 
six countries should ensure rapid economic progress as a result of an 
enlarged free market for each member country* Contrary to some 
opinions, the Common Market does not seem to have any serious adverse 
effects on the trade of the United States* 
Until the present time, the Common Market has been the greatest 
effort to induce the world to freer trade* Thus far, the broad aims 
of the Common Market have been consistent with the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, that is, mutual trade concessions* 
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